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Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education - A
Question of Layoffs
I. Introduction
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,' the Supreme
Court decided the legitimacy of the means used to effectuate a
racially-based affirmative-action plan of a public employer.2 At
issue in this case was a section of a collective bargaining agree-
ment which provided that in the event of a layoff, senior nonmi-
nority employees would be laid off while junior minority employ-
ees would remain employed.3 The Court held that such a plan
discriminated against nonminority employees in violation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment."
Part II of this Note identifies and discusses United Steel-
workers v. Weber5 and Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts," the leading affirmative-action cases. Part II also high-
lights the similarities and distinctions between and among
Weber, Stotts, and Wygant. Parts III and IV set forth the lower
court decisions, the posture of the case when the Supreme Court
granted certiorari, and the treatment of the case by the Court.
Part V analyzes the Court's decision and comments on the effect
1. 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
2. The public employer in this case was the Jackson Board of Education. The plan
involved a layoff policy affecting teachers in the Jackson Public Schools.
3. The provision in question is contained in article XII of the collective bargaining
agreement:
In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers through
layoff from employment by the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the
district shall be retained, except that at no time will there be a greater percentage
of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority personnel
employed at the time of the layoff. In no event will the number given notice of
possible layoff be greater than the number of positions to be eliminated. Each
teacher so affected will be called back in reverse order for positions for which he is
certificated maintaining the above minority balance.
106 S. Ct. at 1845.
4. "No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
6. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
1
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that the Court's lack of a majority consensus may have upon
employers in this highly sensitive area. Part VI concludes that
given the Court's ambivalence in its treatment of racially-based
layoffs, it remains unclear whether such layoffs are ever
permissible.
II. Background
Racially-based affirmative-action plans have been adopted
for a variety of reasons. They have often been adopted as a court
ordered (involuntary) remedy for actual victims of racial dis-
crimination in employment. They have also been adopted to
eliminate traditional patterns of racial segregation in specific job
titles8 or - where no actual victims of discrimination have
been identified - to make the ratio of the racial composition of
the work force mirror that of employers of a similar kind within
the surrounding areaY The adoption of such plans has been
challenged by employees who considered themselves adversely
affected by the remedy provided. In certain instances, labor un-
ions have been involved because of their role in the adoption of
the plans through the collective bargaining process. 10 The case
law in this area addresses when, and under what circumstances,
employers may, or must, adopt racially-based affirmative-action
plans.
A. Voluntary Affirmative-Action Plans - Private Employers
1. The Title VII Prohibition
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196411 makes it an un-
lawful employment practice for an employer to engage in the fol-
lowing conduct:
7. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (in class action suit alleging
discriminatory hiring practices, plaintiffs were awarded priority consideration for
employment).
8. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). See infra notes 11-22 and
accompanying text.
9. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (proper statistical
comparison was between defendant school district's teaching staff and public school
teacher population in the relevant labor market).
10. 443 U.S. at 193.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (d) (1982).
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(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or oth-
erwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
It is also unlawful for:
any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retrain-
ing, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate
against any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin in admission to, or employment in, any program
established to provide apprenticeship or other training.'"
2. Permissible Exceptions
The issue of whether an employer may voluntarily adopt ra-
cially-based affirmative-action plans was raised and considered
by the Court in United Steelworkers v. Weber."' The case con-
cerned a challenge to an affirmative-action plan which had been
negotiated between an employer and a steelworkers' union.'5
The challenge was brought by Weber, a white member of the
bargaining unit who had been rejected for admission into a
craft-training program. The most senior black trainee accepted
into the program had less seniority than Weber.
The purpose of the negotiated affirmative-action plan was
12. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
13. Id. § 2000e-2(d).
14. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
15. The employer, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., and the union, United
Steelworkers of America, entered into a collective bargaining agreement which included
"an affirmative action plan designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalances in Kai-
ser's then almost exclusively white craftwork forces by reserving for black employees
50% of the openings in in-plant craft-training programs until the percentage of black
craftworkers in a plant is commensurate with the percentage of blacks in the local labor
force." Id.
1988]
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"to eliminate traditional patterns of racial segregation"' at sev-
eral of the employer's plants. Because the affirmative-action
plan was designed to remedy the effects of prior discrimination,
and because the plan was one negotiated between a private em-
ployer and a union which represented employees for collective
bargaining purposes, the Weber Court was "not concerned with
what Title VII requires or with what a court might order to rem-
edy a past proved violation of the Act. 1 7 The issue framed by
the Court in Weber was "whether Title VII forbids private em-
ployers and unions from voluntarily agreeing upon bona fide af-
firmative-action plans that accord racial preferences in the man-
ner and for the purpose provided in the [employer-union]
plan."' 8 In holding that the plan was permissible, the Court de-
termined that "Title VII's prohibition ... against racial discrim-
ination does not condemn all private, voluntary, race-conscious
affirmative-action plans."'
3. The Weber Test
The Weber Court did not find it necessary to detail the line
of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirma-
tive-action plans.2 0 However, it did articulate the following ele-
ments to consider in testing the effect of such a plan on
nonminorities:
(1) "[T]he plan does not unnecessarily trammel the inter-
ests of the white employees."'2
(2) "The plan does not require the discharge of white work-
ers and their replacements with new black hirees. 22
(3) "[T]he plan [does not] create an absolute bar to the ad-
vancement of white employees .... 2
(4) "[T]he plan is a temporary measure; it is not intended to
maintain racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest ra-
16. Id. at 201.
17. Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
18. Id. (emphasis in original).
19. Id. at 208.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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cial imbalance."'
4. Voluntary Remedies Occasioned by Statistical Dispari-
ties Are Permissible
Weber concluded that title VII leaves to private employers
an "area of discretion.., to... voluntarily.., adopt affirmative
action plans designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance
in traditionally segregated job categories."25 In his concurring
opinion, Justice Blackmun noted that the Court had expanded
the bounds of title VII by failing to restrict racially-based reme-
dies to actual victims of prior discrimination.2 6
Although Justice Blackmun would have adopted the "argua-
ble violation" requisite which Judge Wisdom had espoused in
his dissent to the court of appeals decision in Weber v. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chemical Corp.,27 he found this broader standard
acceptable." The significance of this construction is that statis-
tical disparities alone would permit a private employer's adop-
tion of a racially-based affirmative-action plan. An employer
need not admit that it violated title VII in order to justify such a
plan. 9
B. Involuntary Affirmative-Action Plans - Public Em-
ployers
In Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,30 the Court
again considered a challenge by nonminorities to a racially-based
affirmative-action plan. Originally, minority employees had filed
24. Id.
25. Id. at 209.
26. Id. at 213.
27. 563 F.2d 216, 230-31 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, C.J., dissenting). Judge Wisdom
would have held that an "arguable violation" of title VII occurs when a statistical analy-
sis of the workforce composition indicates past discrimination, even though no evidence
of actual discrimination exists. Id.
28. 443 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun acknowledged the
difficulty of using an actual past discrimination prerequisite in the case. Kaiser, fearing
claims for damages from prior victims would have been reluctant to demonstrate actual
prior instances of discrimination. Weber's alleged title VII violation could have been
mooted, therefore, if no one had any incentive to prove that Kaiser had violated the Act.
See id. at 213-14.
29. Id. at 213-14.
30. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
1988]
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a class action against the City of Memphis, Tennessee, and its
fire department, alleging racial discrimination in hiring and pro-
motion practices.3 ' The case was settled, and a consent decree
was approved and entered by the district court.32 When the City
subsequently announced its intent to lay off firefighters on the
basis of seniority (last hired, first fired), the district court en-
joined the City from laying off any black employee, and modi-
fied the consent decree. 33 In order to comply with the court's
order, a modified layoff plan, designed to protect black employ-
ees, was presented and approved. Layoffs were carried out pur-
suant to this plan.3 4 The ensuing layoffs, made in accordance
with the plan, resulted in nonminority employees - with more
seniority than minority employees - being laid off or demoted
in rank."6
1. Layoffs - A Significant Difference
The most significant difference between Weber and Stotts is
that unlike Weber, the racially-based plan in Stotts involved
layoffs. By requiring that no black employee be laid off, the
court order adversely affected an existing seniority system which
both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court held to be
bona fide.36 Furthermore, the plan in Stotts had been imposed
by the district court's injunction. "Neither the Union nor the
nonminority employees were parties to the suit when the [con-
sent] decree was entered. Hence the entry of that decree cannot
be said to indicate any agreement by them to any of its terms.'""
31. Id. at 565.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 566-67.
34. Id. at 567.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 574-77.
Section 703(h) of Title VII provides that it is not an unlawful employment prac-
tice to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority system, provided
that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of
race.... Section 703(h) ... permits the routine application of a seniority system
absent proof of an intention to discriminate.
Id. at 577 (citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 352 (1977)).
37. Id. at 575. The district court had justified its right to take action based on its
retention of jurisdiction of the case as set forth in the original consent decree, "for such
further orders as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this de-
[Vol. 8:159
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In this respect, the racially-based plan was involuntary. Unlike
the plan in Weber, it had not been negotiated between the em-
ployer and the union.
2. Involuntary Remedies - Only for Actual Victims of
Discrimination
The Stotts Court's holding, that the layoff plan at issue was
impermissible, was based on the effect of the plan on the nonmi-
nority employees. The Court determined that the "displacement
of white employees with seniority over blacks" was a result that
had not been included in the original agreed-upon remedy of the
consent decree. 8 Arguably, the remedy would be impermissible
under a Weber analysis because of such displacement.39 How-
ever, the Stotts Court did not adopt the Weber analysis. The
Court held that the remedy, which awarded competitive senior-
ity to minority employees who were not actual victims of prior
discrimination, was not an available remedy under title VII and
applied the rationale of an earlier case, Teamsters v. United
States.0 The Teamsters Court had determined that under
§ 706(g) of title VII, "make-whole relief [was available] only to
those who have been actual victims of illegal discrimination."' 1
The Stotts Court confirmed that "mere membership in the dis-
advantaged class is insufficient to warrant a seniority award;
each individual must prove that the discriminatory practice had
an impact on him.' 2 Such "make-whole" relief may contain an
award of competitive seniority, and the victims would be given
their "rightful place on the seniority roster.' 3
In Stotts, the beneficiaries of the remedial plan were not
cree." Id. at 565-66 (quoting Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 578 (6th Cir.
1982)).
38. Id. at 575.
39. 443 U.S. at 208. While not a perfect fit, the displacement found by the Stotts
Court would seem to violate the second element of the Weber analysis. See supra text
accompanying note 24.
40. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). "Our ruling in Teamsters that a court can award competi-
tive seniority only when the beneficiary of the award has actually been a victim of illegal
discrimination is consistent with the policy behind §706(g) of Title VII, which affects the
remedies available in Title VII litigation." 467 U.S. at 579-80.
41. 467 U.S. at 579-80.
42. Id. at 579 (citing 431 U.S. at 367-71).
43. Id. at 578-79.
19881
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identified as having been actual victims of prior discrimination."'
Therefore, the Court held that under title VII, the action taken
by the lower courts exceeded the remedy that a court could have
given had the case been tried and had plaintiffs' allegation of a
pattern or practice of discrimination been proven.45
Another significant distinction between Weber and Stotts,
in addition to the voluntary/involuntary adoption of the ra-
cially-based plan, is that unlike Weber, Stotts involved an em-
ployer in the public sector. The Court concluded that it need not
decide whether "the City, a public employer, could have taken
this course voluntarily without violating the law."4
III. Wygant: Facts and Lower Court Decisions
A. The Facts
In 1969, the NAACP complained to the Michigan Civil
Rights Commission that the Jackson Board of Education "had
engaged in various discriminatory practices, including racial dis-
crimination in the hiring of teachers. 47 The Michigan Civil
Rights Commission determined that the allegations in the com-
plaint were justified, and negotiated an adjustment order
whereby the Board agreed to "[t]ake affirmative steps to recruit,
hire and promote minority group teachers and counselors as po-
sitions [became] available ....""
In the years 1970-1971, a study was made of the representa-
tion of minorities on the faculty of the Jackson public schools. A
comparison was made of the percentage of minority teachers to
the percentage of minority students in the district. Nearly 16%
of the student body was made up of minorities, whereas minori-
ties represented only 8.3-8.5% of the faculty. The collective bar-
gaining agreement in effect at that time, November 1971, man-
dated that straight seniority would govern (last hired, first fired)
44. Id. at 579.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 583 (emphasis added).
47. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1859 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
48. Id. These facts, relied upon by Justice Marshall in his dissent, were "lodged" by
the Board as part of its brief, and were not part of the record in the lower court proceed-
ings. See Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1849 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 8:159
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in the event of layoffs. 9
In the spring of 1972, contract negotiations began. The cli-
mate for negotiation was influenced by the Michigan Civil
Rights Commission adjustment order and by a January 1972
survey of all teachers concerning the district's layoff policy.
Ninety-six percent "expressed a preference for the straight
seniority system and opposed a system that would freeze minor-
ity layoffs." 50 There also had been a boiling over of racial ten-
sion, with resultant violence at the Jackson High School, in Feb-
ruary of that year.5 1 The negotiations resulted in a tentative
agreement which included protective provisions against minority
layoffs. Following a short strike in the fall of 1972, the contract
was ratified for the 1972-1973 school year. Article XII, the chal-
lenged provision, was included in that agreement.2
The express goal of the remedial plan, expressed in article
XII(D)(1), was "to have at least the same percentage of minority
racial representation on each individual staff as [was] repre-
sented by the student population of the Jackson Public
Schools."53 Article XII(B)(1) sought to preserve that goal by
providing protection against layoffs to minorities. "[A]t no time
will there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off
than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at
the time of the layoff." 54 The contract language was followed
when layoffs were required in the spring of 1973. When the same
situation prevailed in 1974, however, the Board of Education ig-
nored the contract language, retained tenured teachers, and
failed to maintain the required percentage of minority faculty.5
An action was brought in district court by the union and two
minority teachers claiming breach of contract and "that the
Board's failure to adhere to the layoff provision violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ' '56 The Board denied any
49. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 546 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
50. Id. at 1197.
51. Id. at 1198.
52. id.
53. Id. (emphasis omitted).
54. Id. (emphasis omitted).
55. Id.
56. 106 S. Ct. at 1845 (citing Jackson Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., No. 4-72340
19881
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prior employment discrimination in its answer to the com-
plaint.51 Following dismissal of the action on procedural
grounds, the union and minority teachers brought an action in
Jackson County Circuit Court alleging the same claims.5 8 Enter-
ing a judgment on behalf of these plaintiffs, that court rejected
the Board's opposing argument that the layoff provision violated
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court also determined that
nothing had established that the Board's hiring practices had
discriminated against minorities. The court attributed the mi-
nority representation on the faculty to societal racial discrimina-
tion and, even though article XII had a discriminatory effect on
nonminority teachers, the court held that it was a permissible
attempt to remedy the effects of societal discrimination.59
B. Procedural History
1. District Court
The suit in the instant case was brought by nonminority
teachers when the Board "adhered to the letter of the contract
when layoffs were next required."60 The case heard by the dis-
trict court was based upon plaintiffs' challenge of the layoff pro-
visions on grounds that they violated the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.61 The district court held that a
prior judicial finding of past discrimination was not required as
a prerequisite to adoption of an affirmative-action plan, citing
Weber as authority for this determination. 2
a. Detroit Police Officers' Association v. Young
Recognizing that Weber applied to a private sector em-
ployer, and to title VII violations, the district court held that the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in a prior case, Detroit
(E.D. Mich. 1976)).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Wygant, 546 F. Supp. at 1198.
61. Id. at 1199. The plaintiffs sued on a variety of federal and state law claims which
were dismissed by the district court. These claims are not discussed here because the
subject matter is outside the scope of this Note.
62. Id.
[Vol. 8:159
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Police Officers' Association v. Young,"3 "extended this particular
holding of Weber to public sector employers and to alleged Con-
stitutional violations."'
In Young, the Detroit Police Department, subsequent to its
own determination that blacks were underrepresented in the de-
partment, voluntarily adopted an affirmative-action plan. This
plan contemplated the promotion of black patrolmen to sergeant
ahead of white patrolmen who were higher on the eligibility list.
The plan was challenged by white officers on the grounds that it
violated title VII and equal protection of the laws. The circuit
court, relying on Weber, held that even though there had been
no prior judicial determination of race discrimination, the de-
partment's own determination of racial disparities justified the
voluntary plan.15
b. Application of the Young Standard
The district court adopted the Young court's rationale for
extending Weber to the public sector - that a requirement of a
"judicial determination of past discrimination for a state to un-
dertake a race-conscious remedy . . . would be 'self-defeating'
and would 'severely undermine' voluntary remedial efforts. '66
The Young standard of "substantial and chronic under-
representation" had been adopted directly from the four mem-
ber plurality in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke.17 Applying the Young standard, the district court deter-
mined that the affirmative-action plan served a legitimate pur-
pose6s and affirmed the constitutionality of article XII(B)(1).6 9
To determine whether there was such "substantial and chronic
underrepresentation," the court deemed it appropriate to com-
63. 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1979).
64. 546 F. Supp. at 1199 (emphasis omitted).
65. Id. at 1199-1200.
66. Id. at 1200 (reiterating Young's citation to Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 362 (1978)).
67. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The Bakke Court standard involved a consideration of
whether "there is a sound basis for concluding that minority underrepresentation is sub-
stantial and chronic, and that the handicap of past discrimination is impeding access of
minorities .... Id. at 362.
68. 546 F. Supp. at 1200-01.
69. Id. at 1202-03.
1988]
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pare the percentage of minority teachers to the percentage of
minorities in the student body on the theory that "minority
teachers are role-models for minority students. This is vitally
important because societal discrimination has often deprived
minority children of other role-models. '70
Having determined that there was "substantial and chronic
underrepresentation" based upon the minority faculty/minority
student comparison, the court determined that the ends used
were "substantially related" to the objective of remedying such
underrepresentation which the court had already found to be a
legitimate purpose.71 The "substantially related" criterion was
adopted from the "reasonableness" test applied in Young.72
The court found the layoff provision to be substantially re-
lated for several reasons. First, it was designed to retain or at
least prevent a reduction in the minority to majority ratio. 73 Sec-
ond, it was a temporary measure. 74 Third, it did not require the
retention of unqualified teachers.75 Finally, it did "not require
the layoff of all white teachers or otherwise unnecessarily or in-
vidiously trammel their interests. 76 As to this last element, the
court gave great weight to the fact that the provision had been
voluntarily adopted by the predominantly white membership of
the union.77
2. Court of Appeals
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of
the district court. It adopted both the standard of substantial
70. Id. at 1201.
71. Id. at 1202.
72. Id. at 1201-02 (citing Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503, 510 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981); United States v. Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1338-40 (5th Cir.
1980); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978); and Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 482-92 (1980)).
73. Id. at 1202.
74. "In fact, the layoff provisions are part of a collectively-bargained contract of
limited duration .... subject to change whenever the contract is renegotiated." Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. "[I]t is undeniable that the contract, and thus the challenged layoff provi-
sion, was collectively bargained. It is difficult for the court to conceive how a plan which
has been voluntarily adopted by the membership of the [union] can invidiously trammel
the interests of white teachers, a majority of the [union]." Id.
[Vol. 8:159
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and chronic underrepresentation and the reasonableness test
("substantially related") applied by the district court, and
quoted extensively from Judge Joiner's opinion.78 The appellate
court also accorded considerable weight to the voluntary nature
of the layoff provision. e In this respect, it distinguished
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,a0 which had been
recently decided, and also Oliver v. Kalamazoo Board of Educa-
tion.81 Both cases had been decided after the district court is-
sued its decision.
Stotts involved a judicially imposed modification of a con-
sent decree."' Kalamazoo also involved an involuntary scheme
imposed by a district court.83 The Sixth Circuit concluded that
"[t]he principle involved in both cases seems to be that volun-
tary affirmative action plans contracted between the parties are
easier to defend in the courts than those mandated ab initio by
federal trial courts."8 Not only did the court consider the volun-
tariness of the plan to be determinative, but it also placed em-
phasis on the collective bargaining process as a safeguard of the
rights of nonminority employees, including the plaintiffs.8 5
IV. Supreme Court Decision
A. Plurality Opinion
Justice Powell wrote the opinion of the Court and was
joined in all respects by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehn-
quist. Justice White concurred in the judgment only, while Jus-
tice O'Connor concurred in all parts of the opinion except part
IV which examined layoffs as a means to accomplish the race-
conscious purposes of the affirmative-action plans.8
78. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984).
79. Id. at 1157-58.
80. 467 U.S. 561 (1984). See supra notes 30-46 and accompanying text.
81. 706 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1983).
82. See supra notes 32, 37, and accompanying text.
83. The Wygant court noted that in Kalamazoo, it was held that "the District that
Court did not have the constitutional authority to design and order the remedy of a 20%
hiring quota for black teachers disregarding the contractual and legal seniority and ten-
ure rights of white teachers who would be displaced." 746 F.2d at 1159.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1158. See supra note 77.
86. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1844, 1857 (1986).
1988]
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The Court began its analysis by articulating the appropriate
standard of review for classifications based upon race. "Any
preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily re-
ceive a most searching examination to make sure that it does not
conflict with constitutional guarantees. 8 7 The test adopted by
the Court consisted of two prongs: "First, any racial classifica-
tion 'must be justified by a compelling governmental inter-
est.' "88 The second requirement was that "the means chosen by
the State to effectuate its purpose must be 'narrowly tailored to
the achievement of that goal.' "89 Thus, the plurality made clear
at the outset the limits within which racially-based affirmative-
action plans by public employers must fit in order to pass con-
stitutional muster.
Part III of the plurality's opinion rejected the lower courts'
rationale that the racially-based layoff provision was justified in
effectuating "the Board's interest in providing minority role
models for its minority students, as an attempt to alleviate the
effects of societal discrimination ".... ,9 The Court reaffirmed
its insistence on "some showing of prior discrimination by the
governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of racial
classifications in order to remedy such discrimination." 91 The ra-
tionale behind this requirement was that the measure to be
adopted to cure the prior discrimination will be temporary. At
some point, the remedy will have been achieved and the racially-
based plan will no longer be necessary.92
The Court stated that when statistical disparities are used
to demonstrate the need for a racially-based remedy, "the
87. Id. at 1846 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980)).
88. 106 S. Ct. at 1846 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (citations
omitted)).
89. 106 S. Ct. at 1846 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 480).
90. 106 S. Ct. at 1847. See also supra text accompanying note 70.
91. Id. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (conclud-
ing that a showing of prior discrimination must be determined, and asserting the rele-
vant comparison for making such a determination).
92. "tT]he role model theory employed by the District Court has no logical stopping
point. The role model theory allows the Board to engage in discriminatory hiring and
layoff practices long past the point required by any legitimate remedial purpose." 106 S.
Ct. at 1847. The plan in Weber is an example of a temporary plan. "Preferential selec-
tion of craft trainees at the Gramercy plant will end as soon as the percentage of black
skilled craftworkers in the Gramercy plant approximate the percentage of blacks in the
local labor force." United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979).
[Vol. 8:159
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proper comparison for determining the existence of actual dis-
crimination [is] 'between the racial composition of [the school's]
teaching staff and the racial composition of the qualified public
school teacher population in the relevant labor market.' 93
Thus, the Court rejected the role-model theory as a cure for so-
cietal discrimination for two reasons: 1) such comparisons are
irrelevant for addressing employment discrimination,94 and 2)
the remedy is vague and indefinite."5 The record before the
Court for review contained no evidence of any prior discrimina-
tion in hiring by the Board that would indicate that such reme-
dial action was necessary. 6 Nonetheless, the Court did not de-
cide this issue because it found the layoff provision to be an
impermissible means of "achieving even a compelling
purpose. '97
The Court rejected the "reasonableness" test which had
been applied by the court of appeals98 and held that under the
strict scrutiny standard applicable to racially-based state action,
the means chosen must be sufficiently narrowly tailored to ac-
complish legitimate purposes.9 9 The Court determined that lay-
offs impose too great a burden on innocent individuals,00 as op-
posed to hiring goals where such burdens are "diffused to a
considerable extent among society generally."'01
93. 106 S. Ct. at 1847 (quoting Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308).
94. Id. at 1848. See also id. at 1857 (O'Connor, J., concurring), and Wygant v. Jack-
son Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152, 1159-60 (6th Cir. 1984) (Wellford, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 1983): "[Tlhe students
... do not have a constitutional right to attend a school with a teaching staff of any
particular racial composition.").
95. "[Slocietal discrimination is insufficient and over expansive. In the absence of
particularized findings, a court could uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach into
the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future." 106 S. Ct. at 1848.
96. Id. at 1848-49.
97. Id. at 1849. The Board had contended that if permitted to do so, it could estab-
lish the existence of prior discrimination. The Court noted that this precise issue had
been litigated in two prior suits. "Both courts concluded that any statistical disparities
were the result of general societal discrimination, not of prior discrimination by the
Board." Id.
98. Wygant, 746 F.2d at 1157. See also supra text accompanying note 78.
99. 106 S. Ct. at 1852.
100. Id. at 1851-52.
101. Id. at 1851. The Court pointed to an expectation interest on the part of em-
ployees that stems from the "stability and security" of seniority. See Fallon & Weiler,
Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, SuP. CT. REV. 1, 58 (1984). Citing this article, the
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B. Concurring Opinions
1. Justice White's Concurrence
Justice White concurred only in the judgment of the plural-
ity.102 In a terse one page separate opinion, Justice White ap-
plied a combination of the Weber'03 and Stotts o4 analyses in de-
termining that the layoff plan in this case was violative of the
equal protection clause. At the outset he identified the purpose
of the layoff plan as being "to maintain a certain proportion of
minority teachers." 105 Such a plan was contrary to the fourth el-
ement in the Weber test which required that the plan be tempo-
rary and not intended to maintain racial balance. 0 Because the
layoff plan contemplated the retention of "teachers solely be-
cause they [were] black, even though some of them [wiere in
probationary status,"'10 Justice White also implied that it vio-
lated elements one and two of the Weber test'08 which required
that the plan neither unnecessarily trammel the interests of
white employees'0 9 nor contemplate the discharge of white work-
ers and their replacement with new black hirees. 10 Added to
Justice White's Weber analysis was the implication of the Stotts
requirement that the beneficiaries of the plan must be actual
victims of prior discrimination."' His opinion noted that the
plan contemplated "the discharge of white teachers to make
room for blacks, none of whom ha[d] been shown to be a victim
of any racial discrimination.""'  Although Justice White did not
Court determined that "[1]ayoffs disrupt these settled expectations in a way that general
hiring goals do not." 106 S. Ct. at 1851.
102. 106 S. Ct. at 1858 (White, J., concurring).
103. Weber, 443 U.S. 193. See supra notes 14-29 and accompanying text.
104. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984). See supra
notes 30-46 and accompanying text.
105. 106 S. Ct. at 1857 (White, J., concurring).
106. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
107. 106 S. Ct. at 1857.
108. Id.
109. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
110. 106 S. Ct. at 1857.
111. 467 U.S. at 578-83 and supra note 40. In this aspect of his analysis, Justice
White appeared to extend this requirement of Stotts, which had been decided on title
VII grounds, to equal protection cases as well. The plaintiffs' title VII action had been
dismissed and was not before the Court for review. See supra note 61.
112. 106 S. Ct. at 1857.
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expressly refer to either Weber or Stotts, it seems unmistakable,
based on his language, that elements of those decisions underlie
his reasoning in the separate opinion. He clearly believed that
affirmative-action plans designed to "[lay off] whites who would
otherwise be retained in order to keep blacks on the job" vio-
lated the equal protection clause.11
2. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Justice O'Connor concurred in all parts of the plurality
opinion with the exception of part IV. 14 Although it is apparent
that she agreed, as stated in part IV of the plurality opinion,
that the racially-based remedial measures adopted were not suf-
ficiently narrowly tailored,115 she arrived at that conclusion dif-
ferently than the plurality. Justice O'Connor did not believe
that a racially-based layoff provision per se could not be suffi-
ciently narrowly tailored to pass constitutional muster,1 6 but
rather stated that "[b]ecause the layoff provision here acts to
maintain levels of minority hiring that have no relation to reme-
dying employment discrimination, it cannot be adjudged 'nar-
rowly tailored' to effectuate its asserted remedial purposes." ' 7
Justice O'Connor arrived at her conclusion by first adopting
the plurality position that the appropriate standard of review is
one of strict scrutiny, which requires that the racially-based
remedy serve a compelling governmental purpose 8 and that the
means used be sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve such a
purpose. 9 Justice O'Connor de-emphasized this formulation by
asserting that the Court was in accord that the means "cannot
impose disproportionate harm on the interests, or unnecessarily
trammel the rights, of innocent individuals directly and ad-
113. Id. at 1858.
114. Id. at 1844 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 1857.
116. See id. The plurality finds such layoffs to be too intrusive a burden on "inno-
cent individuals." Id. at 1851-52.
117. Id. at 1857.
118. Id. at 1853. Justice O'Connor contended that "as regards certain state interests
commonly relied upon in formulating affirmative action programs, the distinction be-
tween a 'compelling' and an 'important' governmental purpose may be a negligible one."
119. Id. at 1857.
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versely affected by a plan's racial preference." 120 In like manner,
she found the Court "in accord in believing that a public em-
ployer, consistent with the Constitution, may undertake an
affirmative-action program which is designed to further a legi-
timate remedial purpose ...., Justice O'Connor found addi-
tional unanimity by the Court in that "it is agreed that a plan
need not be limited to the remedying of specific instances of
identified discrimination for it to be deemed sufficiently 'nar-
rowly tailored,' or 'substantially related,' to the correction of
prior discrimination by the state actor. 1 22
In her analysis, Justice O'Connor leaned more toward the
Weber statistical analysis of patterns or practices of prior dis-
crimination 2 ' than toward the Stotts/Teamsters actual victim
test124 as justification for a public employer's having a "firm ba-
sis""' 5 for initiating a racially-based remedial affirmative-action
plan. According to Justice O'Connor, as long as the public em-
ployer can demonstrate some prior discrimination, the plan is
warranted, and it is not necessary that specific victims of such
discrimination be identified by a contemporaneous finding of
prior discrimination by a court or other competent body.' 26 Pub-
lic employers are able to make such determinations by compar-
ing statistical data in the "relevant labor pool sufficient to sup-
port a prima facie Title VII pattern or practice claim by
minority teachers .... ,'127 Such evidence "would lend a compel-
ling basis for a competent authority such as the School Board to
conclude that implementation of a voluntary affirmative action
plan is appropriate to remedy apparent prior employment
discrimination.' ' 28
Justice O'Connor characterized as improper, the lower
courts' reliance on the "societal discrimination" and "role-
model" theories 29 for determining an important governmental
120. Id. at 1853-54.
121. Id. at 1853.
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
125. 106 S. Ct. at 1856.
126. Id. at 1853-56.
127. Id. at 1856. See supra note 91.
128. 106 S. Ct. at 1856.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70 for lower court's analysis.
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interest."'0 The basis of these theories had no foundation in
prior employment discrimination. 131 "[I]t is only when it is es-
tablished that the availability of minorities in the relevant labor
pool substantially exceeded those hired that one may draw an
inference of deliberate discrimination in employment." 'l3 For
Justice O'Connor, the layoffs were not sufficiently narrowly tai-
lored because they were instituted to achieve a purpose unre-
lated to employment discrimination.133 Whether layoffs could
survive a strict scrutiny analysis, apparently decided negatively
by the plurality, is a question that Justice O'Connor found un-
necessary to resolve. 34
C. Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice Marshall's Dissent
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Black-
mun, proposed that the plurality and concurring opinions were
too quick to decide a constitutional issue based on an informal
and incomplete record. 3 5 Justice Marshall argued that the dis-
trict court's failure to develop the record sufficiently "prevented
the full exploration of the facts that are now critical to resolu-
tion of the important issue before us." 136 It is primarily for this
reason that Marshall would have remanded for further proceed-
ings.1 37 Nonetheless, because the constitutional issue had been
130. 106 S. Ct. at 1857.
131. "The disparity between the percentage of minorities on the teaching staff and
the percentage of minorities in the student body is not probative of employment discrim-
ination .... Id.
132. Id. Justice O'Connor pointed out that the Michigan Civil Rights Commission
"determined that the evidence before it supported the allegations of discrimination on
the part of the Jackson School Board, though that determination was never reduced to
formal findings because the School Board, with the agreement of the Jackson Education
Association (Union), voluntarily chose to remedy the perceived violation," and that ab-
sent a finding of prior discrimination the lower courts falsely assumed that "any discrim-
ination addressed by an affirmative action plan could only be termed 'societal.'" Id. at
1854.
133. Id. at 1857.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1858 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136. Id. Respondents sought to provide the Court with ample extra-record material
purporting to support the proposition that there had been evidence of prior discrimina-
tion in the proceedings before the Michigan Civil Rights Commission. Id.
137. Id. at 1866-67.
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decided, Justice Marshall expressed his disagreement with the
conclusions reached.138
Using the proceeding before the Michigan Civil Rights
Commission as a starting point, Justice Marshall considered that
the parties' negotiation of article XII was a proper settlement in
lieu of inevitable title VII litigation.139 This provision, a product
of collective bargaining by the Board and the Union, had been
ratified by a majority vote "[e]ach of the six times that the con-
tract ha[d] been renegotiated" since 1972.140 The dissent distin-
guished Wygant from Stotts by pointing to the role the affected
nonminority employees had played through the collective bar-
gaining process in the adoption of the Wygant racially-based
plan. 141
Justice Marshall's constitutional analysis" 2 recognized that
the Court has been unable to agree upon the appropriate stan-
dard of review for affirmative-action plans which are attacked
under the equal protection clause.1 43 Whether applying a strict
scrutiny standard requiring a compelling state interest, or the
less rigid standard, requiring substantially related means for
achieving important governmental objectives, Justice Marshall
was of the opinion that article XII is constitutionally valid.14 4 He
138. Id. at 1858.
139. Id. at 1862. As a result of negotiations, article XII represented a consensus
between the Board, which had sought a freeze on minority layoffs, and the union, which
had sought to preserve the straight seniority system of last hired, first fired. Id. at 1859-
60.
140. Id. at 1860. At least 80% of the members of the union were white. Id.
141. Id.
142. Justice Marshall framed the issue as: "whether the Constitution prohibits a
union and a local school board from developing a collective-bargaining agreement that
apportions layoffs between two racially determined groups as a means of preserving the
effects of an affirmative hiring policy, the constitutionality of which is unchallenged." Id.
at 1860. Justice Marshall took issue with Justice O'Connor's conclusion which was based
on the propriety of the hiring plan. He argued that the petitioners did not carry their
burden of demonstrating that "at the time they were laid off, the proportion of minority
teachers had equaled or exceeded the appropriate percentage of the minority labor force,
and that continued adherence to affirmative-action goals, therefore, unjustifiably caused
their injuries." Id. at 1860-61 n.3.
143. Id. at 1861.
144. Id. at 1862. Justice Marshall did not believe that strict scrutiny was the correct
standard. "[B]ecause no fundamental right was involved and because whites have none
of the immutable characteristics of a suspect class, the so-called 'strict scrutiny' applied
to cases involving either fundamental rights or suspect classifications was not applica-
ble." Id. at 1861 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978)).
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arrived at this conclusion by defining the "principal state pur-
pose supporting Article XII" as "the need to preserve the levels
of faculty integration achieved through the affirmative hiring
policy adopted in the early 1970's.' ' 145 Integration of the schools
and of the faculty is the affirmative duty of the local school
board" 6 which should not "have delayed ... [by] disputing its
obligations and [thereby] forcing the aggrieved parties to seek
judicial relief."" 7 Justice Marshall, therefore, agreed with the
Court's recognition "that formal findings of past discrimination
are not a necessary predicate to the adoption of affirmative-ac-
tion policies, and that the scope of such policies need not be lim-
ited to remedying specific instances of identifiable dis-
crimination."1
48
Justice Marshall found article XII to be narrowly tailored
because it "allocates the impact of an unavoidable burden pro-
portionately between two racial groups. 14' 9 Race was not the
sole determinative factor; seniority was also considered in select-
ing the individual to be laid off. 50 It was a temporary measure
which, when no longer necessary, would be subject to further ne-
gotiations.15 "Article XII metes out the hardship of layoffs in a
manner that achieves its purpose with the smallest possible
deviation from established norms.' 52 It was Justice Marshall's
contention that the "best evidence that Article XII is a narrow
means to serve important interests is that representatives of all
145. 106 S. Ct. at 1862.
146. Id. at 1863 (citing Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) and
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955)).
147. 106 S. Ct. at 1863.
148. Id. (citing the plurality opinion at 1844 and O'Connor, J., concurring at 1852).
149. 106 S. Ct. at 1865 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra note 3.
150. 106 S. Ct. at 1865. Justice Marshall pointed out that "[t]he general practice of
basing employment decisions on relative seniority may be upset for the sake of other
public policies." Id. at 1864. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 774-75
(1976) (innocent workers displaced by the Court's grant of seniority to victims of em-
ployment discrimination); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 339-40 (1953) (col-
lective-bargaining agreements may go further than statutes in enhancing the seniority of
certain employees for the purpose of fostering legitimate interests); Aeronautical Indus.
Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 528-29 (1949) (preferred seniority status
given to union chairman, to the detriment of veterans); United Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
151. 106 S. Ct. at 1865.
152. Id.
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affected persons, starting from diametrically opposed perspec-
tives, have agreed to it - not once, but six times since 1972.' '153
Apart from his disagreement with the Court's determination
of a complex issue on an arguably incomplete record, Justice
Marshall grounded his dissent on the salutary goal served by ar-
ticle XII in preserving a legitimate and unchallenged affirma-
tive-action hiring policy."" The interests of all employees, both
minority and nonminority, are safeguarded through the repre-
sentative nature of the collective bargaining process."'
2. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens dissented separately to argue that the edu-
cational goals involved in the preservation of minority teachers,
hired pursuant to the Jackson Board of Education's affirmative-
action hiring policy, served a valid public purpose. 156 As did Jus-
tice Marshall, Justice Stevens viewed the collective bargaining
process as an adequate procedural safeguard that had been
adopted "with full participation of the disadvantaged individu-
als and with a narrowly circumscribed berth for the policy's op-
eration."' 7 According to Justice Stevens, the harm to the peti-
tioner was not based on
any lack of respect for their race, or on blind habit and stereo-
type. Rather, petitioners had been laid off for a combination of
two reasons: the economic conditions that have led Jackson to lay
off some teachers, and the special contractual protections in-
153. Id. at 1866. "The collective-bargaining process is a legitimate and powerful ve-
hicle for the resolution of thorny problems, and we have favored 'minimal supervision by
the courts and other governmental agencies over the substantive terms of collective bar-
gaining agreements.' American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 76-77 (1982). We
have also noted that '[s]ignificant freedom must be afforded employers and unions to
create differing seniority systems,' California Brewers Ass'n v. Brygant, 444 U.S. 598, 608
(1980)." Justice Marshall pointed out that "[t]his deference is warranted only if the
union represents the interests of the workers fairly; a union's breach of that duty in the
form of racial discrimination gives rise to an action by the worker against the union." 106
S. Ct. at 1866 n.6 (citing Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 207 (1944)).
154. 106 S. Ct. at 1866.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1867-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 1870. The fairness of the procedures employed to adopt the provision was
evidenced by the fact that "[tihe Union that represents the petitioners negotiated the
provision and agreed to it; the agreement was put to a vote of the membership, and
overwhelmingly approved." Id. at 1869-70.
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tended to preserve the newly integrated character of the faculty
in the Jackson schools."5 8
Justice Stevens saw no difference between a contractual
provision which protects a percentage of minority faculty and
one which may grant immediate tenure to a select group of
teachers possessing special skills.159 The harm would be similarly
generated if the group protected were different. 160 The protec-
tion in this case was "justified by a valid and extremely strong
public interest."' 1 Contrary to the plurality view, Justice Ste-
vens gave no significance to the distinction between a layoff and
hiring plan in analyzing the equal protection issue. 1 2 The harm
suffered is virtually the same and "the distinction is artificial,
for the layoff provision at issue in this case was included as part
of the terms of the hiring of minority and other teachers under
the collective-bargaining agreement.' 163
V. Analysis
A. Wygant: The Link Between Weber and Stotts
The Wygant"' case provided the Court with a factual set-
ting which linked elements of Weber6 5 with elements of
Stotts.'6 In Wygant, the Court had the opportunity to consider
the question it expressly did not decide in Stotts: whether a
public employer may voluntarily adopt a racially-based affirma-
tive-action plan applicable to layoffs.16 7 Although the Court
struck down the plan at issue in Wygant, the validity of racially-
based layoffs has yet to be resolved by a majority of the Court.
The Wygant plurality held the layoff plan to be impermissi-
158. Id. at 1870 (footnote omitted).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. (footnote omitted).
162. Id. n.14.
163. Id. (emphasis in original).
164. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
165. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
166. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
167. See Botts, Labor Law - Has the Supreme Court Put Out the Fire on Court
Ordered Affirmative Action?: Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct.
2576 (1984), 18 CREIGHTON L. REv. 737, 767-68 (1985).
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ble on the facts of the case. 168 Justice White, concurring in the
plurality's conclusion, suggested that racially-based layoff plans
are impermissible in any context.169 Justice O'Connor left open
the validity of a voluntary racially-based layoff plan in the pub-
lic sector.1 0
1. Voluntary Plan by a Private Employer
The common element among Weber, Stotts, and Wygant, is
the adverse effect of a racially-based affirmative-action plan on
nonminorities. Weber stands alone in two respects. The plan did
not involve layoffs, but was tailored to promotion into a craft-
training program.17 1 Secondly, because the employer was in the
private sector, there was no state action to implicate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 172 Wygant's
similarity to Weber, however, lies in the nature of the adoption
of the racially-based plan. As in Weber, the plan in Wygant was
a result of collective bargaining between the employer and the
union.'17 3 Thus, the plan was voluntarily adopted. As such, its
effect on nonminority employees should be analyzed according
to the four part test enunciated in Weber.17" Although the Wy-
gant Court determined that the Weber test was not directly rel-
evant to the Wygant plan, 75 it alluded to a portion of the
Weber analysis in dicta relative to the Court's "concern over the
burden that a preferential layoffs scheme imposes on innocent
168. 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1852 (1986).
169. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text. Justice White's language im-
plies the use of a Weber analysis for this viewpoint.
170. Her analysis seems to permit a plan "keyed to a hiring goal" relevant "to the
remedying of employment discrimination." 106 S. Ct. at 1857.
171. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. But see Wygant at 1846 n.4
("School district collective bargaining agreements constitute state action for purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment.")(citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 218, &
n.12 (1977)).
173. 106 S. Ct. at 1844-45.
174. See 443 U.S. at 208 (setting forth the Weber text). See also supra text accom-
panying note 24 and notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
175. "Since Weber involved a private company, its reasoning concerning the validity
of the hiring plan at issue there is not directly relevant to this case, which involves a
state-imposed plan. No equal protection claim was presented in Weber." 106 S. Ct. at
1851 n.9.
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parties.""7 6
2. Involuntary Plan by a Public Employer
The distinction of the Stotts case was the involuntary na-
ture of the public employer's remedial plan. The Stotts Court
noted that neither the union nor the nonminority employees had
agreed to the racially-based remedial plan.1 77 In both Weber and
Wygant, the plans were voluntarily adopted by the employers
and the unions, and had been incorporated into the respective
collective bargaining agreements.17 8 It is unclear how Stotts
would have been decided had the plan been adopted voluntarily.
Wygant gave the Court the opportunity to consider a volun-
tary plan of a public employer. The underlying factual predicate
of a pattern or practice of racial discrimination by the public
employer was questionable.1 7 9 Therefore, another variable was
introduced to support the Court's analysis. Nonetheless, al-
though the voluntariness issue appeared to be the material ele-
ment of the unresolved question in Stotts,°8 0 the Wygant plural-
ity seems to have discounted the significance of voluntariness
because it viewed layoffs based on race as a legally inappropriate
way to achieve even a compelling purpose.181 Justice White was
176. Id. at 1851. The implication is that, although not "directly relevant," the
Weber reasoning is brought to bear in the context of public sector plans. The Court's
reference is to the second element of the Weber test: "[tihe plan does not require the
discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black hirees." Weber, 443
U.S. at 208.
177. Stotts, 467 U.S. at 575.
178. In Weber, the employer and union had recognized and sought to remedy the
effects of "conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories." 443
U.S. at 209 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, they adopted, through collective bargaining,
a plan designed to eliminate those effects. Similarly, the employer and union in Wygant
sought to use the collective bargaining process to remedy the effects of societal discrimi-
nation, evidenced by the small percentage of minority teachers on the school faculty. 106
S. Ct. at 1846-47.
179. The Wygant plurality found it did not need to address the question of prior
discrimination because the means used to effectuate what may have been a legitimate
purpose were not sufficiently narrowly tailored. 106 S. Ct. at 1849.
180. The unresolved question in Stotts was whether a public employer could volun-
tarily adopt an affirmative action plan without violating the law. See supra text accom-
panying note 46.
181. 106 S. Ct. at 1849. Because the Court focused on the layoff as an improper
means, the issue of voluntariness lost significance.
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of the same view,'8 2 whereas Justice O'Connor hinted that a vol-
untary racially-based layoff plan by a public employer may be
valid if it is "keyed to a hiring goal" relevant "to the remedying
of employment discrimination," and is not employed solely to
remedy general societal discrimination. 83
3. The Seniority Issue
Another common element was the issue of seniority and the
impact that the remedial racially-based plans have on what are
otherwise considered to be bona fide seniority systems."' Wy-
gant was a hybrid of Weber and Stotts. Wygant took from
Weber the element of a voluntary seniority modification agreed
to by the union and grafted it onto the public employer and lay-
off elements present in Stotts. The Wygant factual setting com-
bined elements of Weber and Stotts: a public employer and a
union voluntarily agreeing to a seniority modification with re-
spect to layoffs, based upon race, for the purpose of effectuating
an affirmative action plan.
The decision in Wygant, although an affirmative step in the
evolution of indicia of permissibility in the adoption of racially-
based remedial affirmative-action plans, casts a shadow of uncer-
tainty over the constitutional limitations placed upon employers,
both private and public, in treating employment discrimination
and its remedies. Any consensus to be found in the separate
opinions lies more in the results reached than in the underlying
analyses upon which those results are based.
182. Id. at 1857-58 (White, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 1857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
184. "Section 703(h), however, permits the routine application of a seniority system
absent proof of an intention to discriminate." 467 U.S. at 577 (citing Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 352 (1977)). Section 703(h) provides that "it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensa-
tion, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system . . . provided that such differences are not the result of an
intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982) (codifying Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §
703(h), 78 Stat. 241, 255).
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B. Standard of Review Clarified
Although there may be some lingering uncertainties from
the Wygant decision, it has crystallized the standard of review
to be applied to racially-based remedial affirmative-action plans
involving layoffs by a public employer. Four members of the
Court agreed that the applicable standard of review is one of
strict scrutiny. 85 In view of Justice White's prohibitive stance
against racially-based layoffs,186 it seems fair to conclude that
such a plan will be scrutinized strictly.
Whether the state interest need be a compelling one, as sug-
gested by the plurality,187 or merely an important one, as es-
poused in Justice Marshall's dissent, 8 8 appears to be of little
distinction. 8 " "The Court is in agreement that whatever the for-
mulation employed, remedying past or present racial discrimina-
tion by a state actor is a sufficiently weighty state interest to
warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed affirmative-
action program."190
Similarly, there is a degree of consensus on the second
prong of the plurality's test: that the means used be sufficiently
narrowly tailored.'91 But whether the means used must be suffi-
ciently narrowly tailored or merely "substantially related" as es-
poused by the dissent, the Court was in accord that "a plan need
not be limited to the remedying of specific instances of identi-
fied discrimination for it to be deemed sufficiently 'narrowly tai-
lored,' or 'substantially related,' to the correction of prior dis-
crimination by the state actor."' 92 Accordingly, the Wygant
Court rejected the title VII analysis of Teamsters v. United
States'93 that had been applied by the Court in Stotts.'9 After
Wygant, no findings of prior discrimination are required to ef-
185. See 106 S. Ct. at 1846-47. See also id. at 1852-53 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
186. See id. at 1857-58 (White, J., concurring).
187. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1846-47.
188. Id. at 1861 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
190. Id.
191. 106 S. Ct. at 1847. See also id. at 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
192. Id. at 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
193. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). See supra note 40-43 and accompanying text.
194. 467 U.S. 561 (1984). See supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
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fectuate a racially-based remedy.""5 It is sufficient that the pub-
lic employer recognize a disparity in the racial composition of its
workforce, as compared with that of the relevant labor market,
in order to undertake a voluntary racially-based remedial affirm-
ative-action plan. 19 6
C. The Relevant Statistical Comparison
Wygant also made clear the proper method of determining
racial discrimination in employment. The court below had deter-
mined that the purpose of article XII of the collective bargain-
ing agreement was to remedy the effects of general societal dis-
crimination. 197 Such a focus is too broad to justify a racially-
based employment remedy. The plurality rejected such a broad
based purpose and Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion,
determined the relevant statistical comparison to be "[t]he dis-
parity between the percentage of minorities on the teaching
staff" and that of the relevant labor pool.19 8
D. A Premature Decision
What is troubling about the plurality decision in Wygant is
the Court's apparent disregard of certain significant factual ele-
ments that prevailed, such as the collective bargaining safe-
guards, the apparent prior discrimination determination by the
Michigan Civil Rights Commission and its order of adjust-
ment,199 the hiring goals of the Jackson Board of Education
which went unchallenged, and the historical reasons which led to
the adoption of the article XII layoff provision. 00
Justice Marshall's dissent detailed information supplied by
both parties which had not been included in the record. Because
195. See 106 S. Ct. at 1855 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also id. at 1867 n.7 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
196. See 106 S. Ct. at 1847. See also id. at 1856 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
197. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d at 1156-57.
198. 106 S. Ct. at 1857 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Justice O'Connor's assessment of
the relevant statistical comparison to be used in establishing prior discrimination is con-
sistent with the Court's decision in Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S.
299 (1977), thus indicating that a majority of the Court would agree on this
comparison.).
199. Id. at 1862 & n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
200. See id. at 1858-60.
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the district court did not develop an adequate record, the case
should have been remanded for that purpose, rather than de-
cided on constitutional grounds without adequate factual sup-
port.20' Even though the school board had expressly denied em-
ployment discrimination in a prior action and subsequently was
found by a state court not to have "discriminated against minor-
ities in its hiring practices, '0 2 the adjustment order of the
Michigan Civil Rights Commission was the impetus behind the
negotiation between the school board and the union which in
turn resulted in the adoption of article XII.20 ' The Court did not
have the latter information before it as part of the record.2 04 The
fact that article XII was collectively bargained and the absence
of such information from the record persuasively militates to-
ward Justice Marshall's case for remand.06
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in this case hinged on the
determination that a voluntary racially-based layoff plan,
designed to remedy general societal discrimination is unconstitu-
tional because the plan is irrelevant "to the remedying of em-
ployment discrimination. '"20 6 Had the court remanded the case
for further development of the relevant statistical data, the case
might have been decided differently. Justice O'Connor's opinion
seems to suggest that she would have favored such a layoff pro-
vision had the statistical analysis supported a finding of prior
employment discrimination.0 7
What looms in the background of the plurality's and dis-
sent's analyses in Wygant is the Court's apparent reliance on
the test articulated in Weber.0 In deciding that the layoff pro-
vision is too intrusive a burden on innocent parties, 09 the plu-
201. Id. at 1858.
202. Id. at 1849 n.5. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59.
203. Id. at 1862 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 1848 & n.2.
205. "The haste with which the District Court granted summary judgment to re-
spondents, without seeking to develop the factual allegations contained in respondents'
brief, prevented the full exploration of the facts that are now critical to resolution of the
important issue before us. Respondents' acquiescence in a premature victory in the Dis-
trict Court should not now be used as an instrument of their defeat." Id. at 1858.
206. Id. at 1857 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
207. See supra notes 115-134 and accompanying text.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 14-29.
209. 106 S. Ct. at 1851-52.
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rality implied that the plan unnecessarily trammels the interests
of the white employees210 affected by the racially-based protec-
tion of minority proportions of the faculty. The burden thus
construed is analyzed for its effects upon individuals. When
viewed in this perspective, the collective burden upon nonmi-
norities as a group becomes fragmented, and the voluntary as-
pect of the racially-based plan is lost in the wake of litigation
instituted by obviously dissatisfied plaintiffs.
E. The Role of Collective Bargaining
The collective bargaining process in this case cannot be ig-
nored. Furthermore, the Court's rejection of the remedying of
societal discrimination as a valid purpose should not suffice to
negate the majority's ratification of the racially-based remedial
function of article XII.211 Indeed, it was a concurring opinion in
Stotts that endorsed the negotiation process as a safeguard of
the rights of innocent employees: "'[I]f innocent employees are
to be made to make any sacrifices . . . , they must be repre-
sented and have had full participation rights in the negotiation
process . , "212
1. The Reduced Expectation Interest
Applying Weber to an analysis of a group burden,213 the
participation by ratification of nonminorities in the collective
bargaining process demonstrates an adequate safeguard that the
"white employees" as a group did not have their interests "un-
necessarily trammeled" by article XII.2"' Additionally, the fact
that article XII had been included in the collective bargaining
agreement and had been ratified "six times since 1972 ''215 belies
the plurality's rationale that the employees affected by the layoff
had the "expectation of earning the stability and security of se-
niority." '216 Race was not the only consideration in determining
210. See id.
211. See id. at 1866 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
212. Id. (quoting Stotts, 467 U.S. at 588 n.3 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
213. See id. at 1859-60 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
214. See id. at 1865.
215. Id. at 1866.
216. Id. at 1851.
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those to be laid off; seniority was also a factor.17 Presumably,
those hired during the period in which article XII was in effect
were among the group most likely to be laid off based upon se-
niority, and the express terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment provided the group with notice that seniority was not the
sole determinative factor. Notwithstanding the fact that affected
nonminorities may have been hired before the adoption of arti-
cle XII, the ratification of a contract containing such a signifi-
cant provision is evidence of the reduced expectation of the sta-
bility and security which seniority normally provides.1 8
2. The Matter of Voluntariness
The plurality discounted the utility of the collective bar-
gaining process as a safeguard with respect to racially-based lay-
offs, noting that the senior white employees who carried the rati-
fication vote had nothing to lose by the adoption of article XII.
The junior white employees who might be affected cannot be
said to have waived their rights on the basis of the majority
vote, which may have been contrary to their desires." 9 The plu-
rality noted that
[t]he fact that such a painless accomodation was approved by the
more senior union members six times since 1972 is irrelevant. The
Constitution does not allocate constitutional rights to be distrib-
uted like bloc grants within discrete racial groups; and until it
does, petitioners' more senior union colleagues cannot vote away
petitioners' rights. 20
Although the Court largely relied on a Weber analysis, it is
this constitutional issue, equal protection, that distinguished
Wygant from Weber. Neither Weber nor Stotts, both title VII
cases, was decided on equal protection grounds. Consequently,
the voluntary nature of the affirmative action plan in Weber was
significantly different from the Wygant plan, primarily because,
unlike Weber, the Wygant employer was a public employer
whose racially-based action implicated the fourteenth amend-
217. Id. at 1865 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
218. "Article XII modifies contractual expectations that do not themselves carry
any connotation of merit or achievement .... Id.
219. See 106 S. Ct. at 1850 n.8.
220. Id.
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ment. Thus, unless the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement are recognized as conditions of employment volunta-
rily agreed upon by individuals and the employer, the collective
bargaining agreement between union and employer is of no re-
deeming consequence where the elements of the Weber test are
not satisfied.
The plurality opinion of Justices Powell, Burger, and Rehn-
quist rejected the proposition that the collective bargaining pro-
cess can substitute for an individual in securing a "'waiver' of
the right not to be dealt with by the government on the basis of
one's race .... "I Because Justice O'Connor did not concur in
that portion of the opinion which addressed the collective bar-
gaining aspect,222 it is unclear as to which side of this issue she
would adopt.
F. Will Racially-Based Layoffs Ever Be Permissible?
As a model of judicial guidance in the area of affirmative-
action, the Wygant decision fell short of the mark. Despite the
fact that it resolved the issue of whether findings of prior dis-
crimination are necessary, and that it addressed the relevant
statistical comparisons used to determine prior discrimination,
Wygant raised more questions than it answered. The nature of
the opinion left open the question of whether racially-based lay-
offs in the public sector are ever permissible.223 Whether such
layoffs in the private sector may be permissible was another
question raised by Wygant.22 4
221. Id.
222. See supra text accompanying note 219.
223. Justice O'Connor left open the question of whether any layoff would survive
the strict scrutiny test. 106 S. Ct. at 1857 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In her concurring
opinion, Justice O'Connor emphasized that the layoff provision was "tied to the percent-
age of minority students in the school district, not to the percentage of qualified minor-
ity teachers within the relevant labor pool" and concluded that as such it had "no rela-
tion to remedying employment discrimination ...." Id. at 1857. She therefore found it
unnecessary "to resolve the troubling questions of whether any layoff provision could
survive strict scrutiny or whether this particular layoff provision could, when considered
without reference to the hiring goal it was intended to further, pass the onerous 'nar-
rowly tailored' requirement." Id. Apparently Justice O'Connor would not consider ra-
cially-based remedial measures which contemplate layoffs to be per se impermissible if
they are adopted to effectuate affirmative-action plans to remedy employment discrimi-
nation. Resolution of that issue was reserved for another day.
224. Based on the reasoning of the plurality that layoffs impose too intrusive a bur-
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VI. Conclusion
It is obvious that affirmative-action hiring policies are of lit-
tle significance if they can be disemboweled by cyclical economic
patterns that from time to time generate layoffs. The Court pro-
vides more than lip-service in support of the public policy of
equal employment opportunities. But the plurality's solution of
using hiring goals to accomplish racial balance begs the question
as to how such goals, once met, may be preserved. The rationale
underlying Justice O'Connor's concurrence indicates that a "lay-
off provision" to "maintain levels of minority hiring" which is
related to "remedying employment discrimination" may "be ad-
judged 'narrowly tailored' to effectuate its asserted remedial
purpose. 2 25 Hers is the swing vote between absolutely no ra-
cially-based layoffs, 226 and the preservation of affirmative-action
hiring through some protection against minority layoffs.227
As it stands today, the Court is ambivalent in its treatment
of racially-based layoff provisions. Should the Court be faced
with the issue again, Justice O'Connor may swing the decision in
favor of such layoffs, given the correct factual foundation. To do
so, Justice O'Connor may have to grapple with the voluntariness
issue as it relates to collective bargaining - an issue not ad-
dressed in her concurrence. Until that time, resolution of that
issue, and of the validity of all racially-based layoffs, must wait.
Richard J. Cairns
den, 106 S. Ct. at 1851-52, and of Justice White, that racially-based layoffs are never
permissible, see id. at 1857 (White, J., concurring), it would appear that at least four
members of the Court would find that racially-based layoffs in the private sector would
be unconstitutional under the Weber analysis, which provides that the interests of
nonminorities must not be unnecessarily trammeled.
225. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1857 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). This is a construction of the converse of Justice O'Connor's rationale that
such a provision having no relation to remedying employment discrimination cannot be
narrowly tailored.
226. The plurality and Justice White. See supra notes 86-113 and accompanying
text.
227. The dissenting opinions. See supra notes 135-163 and accompanying text.
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